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BOOK REVIEW
The Legal Imagination. Abridged Ed. James Boyd White.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1985. Pp. 302 Soft
Cover.
Reviewed by Harriet Bearman Wolf*
This is an unusual law book written by an individual who is a
law professor, a professor of English language and literature, and an
adjunct professor of classical studies at the University of Michigan.
James Boyd White's interest in multiple disciplines may account for
the book's diverse selections from works of Frost, Twain, Conrad,
Thoreau, Melville, Proust, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Lawrence,
Donne, Dickens, Tolstoy, Mailer and others. These selections are
used to demonstrate how one's profession or interests affect one's
language, how language is manipulated and controlled by writers,
and how lawyers and judges may improve their use of language.
White begins the book by showing how a single locale, the Mississippi River, is utilized and described differently by three authors
to reflect their unique background or subject emphasis: Twain compares the river pilot's view of a sunset on the river to that of the
uninitiated; Dicken's view of the sunset discloses that of a finicky
traveler; and Parkman completely ignores ascetic impressions in
favor of recreating and commenting on the historic moment when La
Salle claimed the Mississippi Valley and Louisiana for France.
White then applies to lawyers the thesis that a single language is
utilized in unique ways by different interest groups. For example,
White compares judicial opinions dealing with the issue of death
with selections on the same topic written by nonlawyers, in a section
whimsically entitled "A Comparative Anthology on Death."
Methods of portraying people are explored by use of selections
from nonlegal literature and then by examining selections from the
law-in this case, legal literature that attempts to define insanity in
criminal cases. From the selections, the author draws the conclusion
that the existing legal statements of the insanity defense all talk
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about people as caricatures, not characters.
The practical emphasis in this book is on how to write well.
The author's view of the limitations of the legal language system is
emphatically presented. White describes it as a system of rules which
operates:
•.. by reducing what can be said about experience to a series of
questions cast in terms of legal conclusions ('legal issues') which
must be answered simply 'yes' or 'no'; it maintains a false pretense that it can be used as a language of description or naming
when in fact it calls for a process of complex judgment, to which
it seems to give no directions whatever; its terms are given (or
appear to be given) rigidly uniform meanings of a kind radically
inconsistent with the conventions of ordinary speech; and its
crucial terms are almost always imperfect generalities. (pp. 11213)
The legal language system speaks "in a set of official voices, reducing people to institutional identities, insisting on the repetition of inherited patterns of thought and speech ...

and reposing an impossi-

ble confidence in its fictional pretenses." (p. 208)
The selections in the book are used to illustrate and explain
techniques and styles of writing. A section in the book, for example,
defines metaphor, irony and ambiguity and contains selections exemplifying the use of these techniques. With respect to these selections,
the author explains that the legal writer may learn from them to
assert:
...

control over a language by taking a position outside it, from

which he may use it to say, or at least to recognize, more than
the language in other hands would be made to say, more than it
seems to want to say, something new and different. The writer,
that is, speaks two ways at once: using a language and at the
same time recognizing what it leaves out. He is defined less by
the language he uses than by the relationship with it that he can
establish and maintain less by his material than by his art. (p.
71)
The discussion and examples of characterization are for the
purpose of elucidating that no matter what literary resources are
available to the writer, a real person will never be captured by
words, and that in fact "how one talks about another person is really
a question of degree, not kind . . . . The task of the writer is to
choose his place along that scale with some real understanding of
what the choice entails and an awareness of why he made that choice
rather than another." (p. 154)

1986]

BOOK REVIEW

Underlying the exposition of how language controls the writer
or speaker and how the user of language may manipulate it for his
own purposes, is a personal concern, one that we may have shared in
our law school days and which may be relevant to us today. In the
introduction, the author asks "how an intelligent and educated person can possibly spend his life working with the law when life is
short and there is so much else to do." (p. xxii) Specifically, "given
the other alternatives, why would anyone want to spend his time
reading and writing the language of law?" Happily for all of us,
White concludes that there is good reason to be a lawyer. After all,
"the lawyer is at heart a writer, one who lives by the power of his
imagination." (p. 208) The lawyer's work involves imagining ahead
of time how to deal with opponents, juries and judges. Lawyers must
imaginatively organize facts and interpret them, express facts in an
original way so that one's statement of one's own version of things
can stand the test of comparison with another version, so that it will
be taken as the right one. (p. 209) Although the legal language system is flawed,
[d]ispute is disorder, potentially chaos: the legal language system provides a way by which the disorder is confined, a language in which a conclusion can be stated and understood. We
fight about one thing, but at the same time say we agree about
thirty others, to keep disorder from spreading. (p. 229)
This book was originally used as a course book for law students
(p. xi) and although it has been abridged to remove much of the
technical legal material, the remaining writing and reading assignments, and numerous discussion questions call to mind law school
lectures and assignments. In fact, the reader may wish, as this reviewer did, that a teacher's manual was available to explain the intended thrust of some of the discussion questions. The legal selections included in the book were chosen to demonstrate the
inadequacies of the legal language system. Examples of outstanding
legal writing in which some of the techniques advocated by the author are applied are, unfortunately, missing.
This is not to say that the book is without value. Certainly
every research and writing instructor should at least scan it. The
section on the insanity defense would be of interest to the criminal
law professor. Anyone with a limited background in the humanities
would receive an introduction to some of the major writers in various
disciplines. For those interested in improving their legal writing, this
book would be of great benefit. White has some excellent advice and
ideas. One the high points of the book for me was the following
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comments concerning judicial opinions.
[T]he whole point of the judicial process is to call a person or
event a name, to affix a label . . . . [1If it is to express the
process by which the original intention is worked out, the judicial narrative must keep the reader in a sort of suspense or
open-mindedness, during which he is exposed one by one to the
facts and arguments that seem important to the judge, until the
reader has them all, at which point he should find himself
agreeing with the judgment .... [T]he movement of the opinion, like that of the poem, ought to be one of education; expressing a change from one attitude, one way of seeing things, to
another, by an expansion of understanding .... What this sort
of writing achieves, then, can be put in terms of honesty and
ease: it opens up for the reader one's doubts, it points out the
places of greatest weakness, of most likely difference; it facilitates his judgment and makes it more likely to be sound. (pp.
238-39)

